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1. Introduction 
Do companies make strategic decisions to incorporate in certain jurisdictions following a 
search for the most favourable legal rules? This is likely to be the case as far as businesses 
choose a place of incorporation in order to reduce their tax bill.
1
 As far as company law is 
concerned, a crucial question is how far firms can freely choose their place of incorporation 
regardless of the place where they have physical ties. Countries that follow the ‘incorporation 
theory’ recognise any company properly constituted according to the law of another country. 
Notably, this is the case in the US, with the result that many listed US companies choose 
Delaware as their place of incorporation.
2
 By contrast, countries of the ‘real-seat theory’ seek 
to prevent the evasion of domestic law by requiring that a company is incorporated in the 
country of its headquarters. 
In the European Union, an interesting situation has emerged. The freedom of establishment of 
the EU Treaty and the corresponding case law of the Court of Justice have led to a shift in the 
direction of the ‘incorporation theory’; yet, it can also be observed that some Member States 
have retained some elements of the ‘real seat’ theory.3 Thus, this paper aims to explore the 
impact of these restrictions on the market for incorporations. It also fills gaps in the previous 
empirical literature on this topic, as it is limited in at least two respects: following the 
scenario of the landmark case in this area (Centros), it has focussed on the analysis of 
foreign-based companies in the UK and it has been mainly concerned with differences in the 
costs of incorporation, such as the minimum capital requirements.
4
 By contrast, this paper 
presents data on all incorporations of foreign businesses in the commercial registers of each 
Member State today. It is also the first one to examine the impact of differences in the 
conflict of laws rules applicable to companies. This is an essential question to explore since 
the EU Commission considers proposing a new European instrument to harmonise these 
conflict of laws rules.
5
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the problem of the law on 
corporate mobility in the EU, it provides an overview of the previous empirical research and 
it explains the data collection of the present study. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics of 
foreign-based private companies in all Member States today as well as time series data on 
new incorporations in the UK since 1990. These new data are one of the innovations of this 
paper. They also provide an initial assessment of whether there is a meaningful market for 
incorporations in the EU. The regression analysis in Section 4 turns to the question of 
whether the country differences can be explained by differences in conflict of laws rules 
applicable to companies and/or other factors: it confirms that this seems to be the case. The 
concluding Section 5 reflects on the wider implications of the findings, including the possibly 
impact of the result of the UK’s ‘Brexit-referendum’. 
                                                 
1
 As illustrated by the so-called ‘Panama Papers’, see Section 2.2 (final paragraph), below. 
2
 For US-EU comparisons see, eg, M Ventoruzzo et al, Comparative Corporate Law 35-97 (St. Paul, MN: West 
Academic 2015); F Mucciarelli, ‘The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. 
and the E.U.’ (2012) 20 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 421. 
3
 See Sections 2.1 and 4.2, below. 
4
 See Sections 2.1 and 2.2, below. 
5
 See the consultation ‘EU Company law upgraded: Rules on digital solutions and efficient cross-border opera-
tions’ (10 May 2017), available at http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=58190. 
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2. Background, previous research and data collection 
2.1 Background and overview of legal situation in the EU 
In the EU, despite partial harmonisation of substantive rules, companies are mostly creatures 
of national law. As a starting point, it is also for Member States to decide whether, for the 
conflict of laws rules applicable to companies (lex societatis), they apply the ‘incorporation 
theory’ or the ‘real seat theory’. This has important implications for corporate mobility since 
countries of ‘real seat theory’ would not accept it if a business incorporated in a Member 
State other than that of its headquarters. 
The case law of the Court of Justice,
6
 interpreting the freedom of establishment of the EU 
Treaty,
7
 has led to some liberalisation regarding the freedom of selecting the preferred lex 
societatis. Although the Court does not phrase its arguments in the categories of conflict of 
laws rules, it has become clear that its case law has imposed some restrictions on the use of 
the real seat theory for companies from other Member States. This became most obvious in 
the landmark case of Centros: two Danish citizens living in Denmark established a limited 
liability company (ltd) in the UK. The founders’ main motivation was to avoid the minimum 
capital requirements under Danish law. The Danish authorities refused to register a branch of 
Centros ltd in the commercial register because it did not plan to conduct business anywhere 
except in Denmark. The Court of Justice rejected this line of reasoning and held that Centros 
ltd was validly exercising its freedom of establishment and that the refusal to register was an 
obstacle to this freedom.
8
 
However, the Court also affirmed that Denmark was ‘entitled to take measures designed to 
prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the 
Treaty, improperly to circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals from 
improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of [the freedoms]’.9 In addition, the case law of 
the Court of Justice has emphasised repeatedly that it is possible for Member States to 
provide that incorporations in their own jurisdiction are tied to the requirement that the 
company has its headquarters, or other physical elements, in this country.
10
 
Thus, the Court of Justice has left some ambiguities about the possibility of corporate 
mobility. It is therefore possible to distinguish between Member States that have a clear-cut 
version of the ‘incorporation theory’ and those that have retained some elements of the ‘real 
seat’ theory.11 Correspondingly, it is not clear whether it can be said that, at present, there is a 
meaningful market for incorporations in the EU, thus raising the question how widespread it 
                                                 
6
 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen (1999) C-212/97; Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Com-
pany Baumanagement GmbH (2002) C-208/00; Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire 
Art Ltd. (2003) C-167/01; SEVIC Sytems AG v Amtsgericht Neuwied (2005) C-411/03; Cartesio Oktato es Szol-
galtato bt (2008) C- 210/06; VALE Építési kft. (2012) C-210/06. For further details see LSE Enterprise, Study on 
the Law Applicable to Companies: Final Report (Report for EU Commission, DG Justice), 2016, available at 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2838/527231. 
7
 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), article 49. 
8
 Centros, above note 6, at para. 22. 
9
 Centros, ibid, at paras. 24-25. 
10
 Cartesio, above note 6, confirming The Queen v HM Treasury and Commissioners for Inland Revenue, ex p 
Daily Mail and General Trust plc (1988) C-81/87. 
11
 See Section 4.2, below. 
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is that companies have their ‘real seat’ in a Member State different from the state of 
incorporation. This paper will attempt to answer these questions. 
2.2 Previous empirical research 
The European study on the application of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive explained the 
problems with collecting statistical data on questions of cross-border company mobility and 
on cross-border mergers in particular, as follows: 
‘Collecting this data proved extremely challenging, as the information that the 
national registries keep is partial, and the commercial databases were inconsistent 
and scarce. Indeed, previous studies on parallel topics encountered the same 
problems in gathering accurate and quality information’.12 
The task of collecting data on the number of companies that operate in a Member State 
different from the one in which they have been incorporated or have their real seat is also a 
demanding one. To start with, it is therefore helpful to present an overview of the scope and 
method of the existing empirical research which has aimed to tackle this problem. 
Table 1. Overview of empirical research on corporate mobility in the EU
13
 
Paper 
Topic / countries 
and time frame  
Methodology of data collection 
Armour 
(2005)
14
 
German 
businesses 
incorpora-
ting as UK 
ltds 
1999 
to 
2004 
 Identified companies in the Companies House database, which 
had a largely German-language name and the name was ending 
with ‘Limited’  
 Acknowledged limitations: data merely impressionistic, 
potentially under or over-inclusive 
Becht et 
al 
(2008)
15
 
Businesses 
from EEA 
countries 
incorpora-
ting as UK 
ltds 
1997 
to 
2006 
 Data obtained from the FAME database (Bureau van Dijk); 
where FAME data was incomplete, correction factors were 
applied (based on a comparison between FAME and Companies 
House databases)  
 Directors’ residence as main criterion (with 50% and 100% 
thresholds) 
                                                 
12
 Study on the Application of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive, prepared by Bech-Bruun and Lexidale for 
DG MARKT, 2013, at p 962. 
13
 In addition, some empirical studies, not discussed here, have analysed the incorporation of businesses as a 
European Company (SE), see eg H Eidenmüller, A Engert and L Hornuf, ‘How Does the Market React to the 
Societas Europaea?’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 35. 
14
 J Armour, ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’ (2005) 58 
Current Legal Problems 369. 
15
 M Becht, C Mayer and H Wagner, ‘Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry’ (2008) 
14 Journal of Corporate Finance 241. 
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Becht et 
al 
(2009)
16
 
Registration 
of branches 
of UK ltds in 
ten Member 
States 
2006  Data obtained through field experiments with assistance from 
country correspondents who reported on their attempts to 
incorporate and branch back a UK ltd 
 Information recorded in the experiments includes the number of 
procedures involved, their cost and duration, as well as any 
obstacles encountered 
Laa-
manen 
et al 
(2012)
17
 
Relocation 
of HQs in 17 
European 
countries 
1996 
to 
2006 
 News databases by Lexis/Nexis and Reuters; further internet 
checks 
 Data mainly capture larger public companies 
Braun 
et al 
(2013)
18
 
Incorpora-
tion of 
private 
companies in 
five Member 
States 
One 
year 
+/-
law 
refor
m 
 Most data collected from the AMADEUS database (Bureau van 
Dijk); for Germany and Poland, data collected directly from 
national company registers  
 Directors’ residence as main criterion  
Muller 
et al 
(2013)
19
 
Cross-border 
mobility of 
SEs 
and  
transfers of 
registered 
offices 
2009 
to 
2011 
and 
2007 
to 
2012 
 Regarding mobility of SEs, the European Trade Union 
Institute’s European Company database was used together with 
the Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk) 
 Regarding mobility of other companies, national business 
registers were directly contacted, generally to no avail 
(exception: Malta); indirect data collection (matching de-
registrations with new registrations, Zephyr database used to 
track cross-border mergers) 
Bech-
Brunn 
& Lexi-
dale 
(2013)
20
 
Cross-border 
mergers in 
EU 
2008 
to 
2012 
 Timing of reincorporation tracked through direct and indirect 
enquiries (Thomson Knowledge, LexisNexis, Thomson Reuters) 
 Further information collected from various reports and the 
European Trade Union Institute 
Ringe 
(2013)
21
 
German and 
Austrian 
businesses 
2004 
to 
2011 
 Data on German and Austrian companies collected from the 
Companies House via FAME database 
 Centros type companies identified if company incorporated in 
                                                 
16
 M Becht, L Enriques and VE Korom, ‘Centros and the Cost of Branching’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 171. Modified version also in M Becht, L Enriques and VE Korom, ‘Centros and the cost of branching’, 
in Perspectives in Company Law and Financial Regulation 91 (M Tisen et al, eds., Cambridge: CUP 2009). 
17
 T Laamanen, T Simula and S Torstila, ‘Cross-Border Relocations of Headquarters in Europe’ (2012) 43 Jour-
nal of International Business Studies 187. 
18
 R Braun, H Eidenmüller, A Engert and L Hornuf, ‘Does Charter Competition Foster Entrepreneurship? A 
Difference-in-Difference Approach to European Company Law Reforms’ (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 399. Also published in L Hornuf, Regulatory Competition in European Corporate and Capital Market 
Law: An Empirical Analysis (Cambridge: Intersentia 2012). 
19
 P Muller, S Devnani, R Ladher and P Ramada, ‘European Added Value Assessment on a Directive on the 
cross-border transfer of company seats (14th Company Law Directive), Annex II: Economic and Social Effects 
of the Requested Legislative Instrument - Research paper by London Economics’ (Brussels 2013), available at 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/494460/IPOL-
JOIN_ET%282013%29494460%28ANN02%29_EN.pdf. 
20
 See above note 12. 
21
 WG Ringe, ‘Corporate Mobility in the European Union – a Flash in the Pan? An Empirical Study on the Suc-
cess of Lawmaking and Regulatory Competition’ (2013) 10 European Company and Financial Law Review 
230. 
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incorpora-
ting as UK 
ltds 
the UK with at least one German director where the company 
shares its registered office with at least 100 other companies 
(proxy for the involvement of an incorporation agency) 
Sick 
(2015)
22
 
German 
business 
with more 
than 500 
employees 
incorporated 
in foreign 
legal form 
1995 
to 
2014 
 Combination of primary and secondary data sources, including: 
Federal Gazette’s company reports, previous studies, corporate 
websites and other corporate databases 
Teich-
mann 
and 
Knaier 
(2015)
23
 
Austrian 
businesses 
incorpo-
rating as 
German 
companies 
2009 
to 
2012 
 Data derived from the German Commercial Register by the 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag 
 German ‘letterbox’ companies (GmbHs / UGs) doing business 
in Austria were identified when shareholder is also the 
managing director and lives where the company does its main 
business 
 
This literature suggests different proxies to identify the country with which companies are 
mostly connected, despite being incorporated in another jurisdiction. It has been observed 
that the registration of branches is not strictly enforced in many Member States.
24
 Therefore, 
the most promising strategies is to proceed indirectly by examining the company’s filings in 
the state of incorporation. One possibility is to use the address of the directors as an 
indication of the company’s real seat. The proxy can be further varied by, for example, 
classifying a company as formally foreign if all directors live abroad, or if the majority lives 
abroad.
25
 As far as the information is available, it can also be revealing to identify whether 
the managing director is also a shareholder (or even the sole shareholder).
26
 
Alternatively, one may go further and aim to collect information about companies without 
any physical connection of the company to the country of incorporation. In order to identify 
such companies some studies have examined whether the company’s registered office was 
shared with at least 100 other companies – i.e. it having a mere ‘letterbox’ in the country of 
incorporation. This is said to work reasonably well for the UK where registration agents use 
the same address for a large number of companies without any business activity in the state of 
incorporation,
27
 while in other countries this strategy is less reliable. 
In this respect, a terminological and substantial clarification has to be made. In the literature, 
the term ‘letterbox companies’ is occasionally used for such companies that do business in 
                                                 
22
 S Sick, ‘Der deutschen Mitbestimmung entzogen: Unternehmen mit ausländischer Rechtsform nehmen zu’ 
Mitbestimmungsförderung, Report February 2015, available at www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_mbf_report_2015_8.pdf. 
23
 C Teichmann and R Knaier, ‘Experiences with the Competition of Regulators – a German Perspective’, in AJ 
Viera González and C Teichmann (eds), Private Company Law reform in Europe: The Race for Flexibility 209 
(Cizur Menor: Aranzadi, Thomson Reuters 2015). 
24
 Becht et al, above note 15, at 245. 
25
 Both definitions were used by Becht et al, ibid, and Braun et al, above note 18. 
26
 As used by Teichmann and Knaier, above note 23. 
27
 Ringe, above note 21, at 247. In addition, Ringe searched whether at least one director was German. 
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one country, but are incorporated with only a ‘letterbox’ in another one.28 However, 
frequently, the term ‘letterbox companies’ is also equated with companies which are mere 
‘special purpose entities’ (SPEs, also called ‘conduit companies’): those too merely have a 
‘letterbox’ in the country of incorporation, but they only hold financial assets and are not 
involved in any business activity in any country, and their main purpose is to benefit from the 
tax advantages that can be gained by using SPEs as intermediate legal entities.
29
 This type of 
letterbox companies is often associated with companies established in offshore tax havens, 
for example in the British Virgin Islands,
30
 but such regimes also exist in some EU Member 
States.
31
 Those companies are not of core interest to the present paper as, due to their lack of 
economic activity, they are unlikely to raise problems of conflict of laws rules applicable to 
companies resulting from a mismatch between place of incorporation and real seat.  
2.3 Data collection of this study 
EU law requires the registration of companies in the commercial registers of the Member 
States
32
 and, as of June 2017, those registers are interconnected at EU level as part of the 
Business Registers Interconnection System (BRIS).
33
 At present, however, the commercial 
registers do not provide researchers with deep-level access to company data from all Member 
States. While it is possible to identify the websites of the commercial registers,
34
 searching 
for data about all companies established in the EU presents various practical problems: the 
websites are usually only available in the official language of the country in question and its 
search functions are often very limited. Furthermore, deep-level access to the information that 
is of interest to this study, such as the nationality and addresses of directors, is not freely 
available but instead is typically charged per access to information on each individual 
company. It is therefore not feasible to compile a comprehensive dataset of the millions of 
European companies through the websites of the commercial registers.  
A more promising path is to make use of the commercial databases provided by Bureau van 
Dijk (BvD). Some of those databases cover company data for specific countries,
35
 but, for our 
purposes, it is helpful that all of the national databases of European countries are integrated in 
the BvD’s general database Orbis.36 Since Orbis is composed of information from various 
                                                 
28
 Ringe, ibid; Teichmann and Knaier, above note 23; KE Sorensen, ‘The Fight Against Letterbox Companies in 
the Internal Market’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 85. 
29
 See, eg, Eurodad, ‘Fifty Shades of Tax Dodging. The EU’s role in supporting an unjust global tax system’ pp. 
18-19 (Brussels: Eurodad 2015), available at www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/5630c89596bec.pdf; UNCTAD, 
‘World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance’ pp. 189-190 (New York: UN 
2015), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf. 
30
 As discussed, following the leaked information from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, see eg ‘Pan-
ama Papers: How assets are hidden and taxes dodged’ (BBC News, 3 April 2016), available at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35943740. 
31
 Eurodad, above note 29, mentions Luxembourg but also Austria, Cyprus, Hungary and Spain. 
32
 Directive 2009/101/EC, art. 3. 
33
 See Directive 2012/17/EU and the Commission implementing regulation (EU) 2015/884. 
34
 List of register are provided at https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_business_registers_in_member_states-106-
en.do and www.ebr.org/index.php/member-countries/. 
35
 See www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/company-information/national (subscription required). 
36
 The other general BvD database, focussing on European data, is Amadeus. However, searching for company 
data from 2014 and 2015, we established that Orbis is more frequently updated since many of these data are not 
yet available through Amadeus. 
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domestic sources, the completeness of the information varies between countries. For most 
Member States, the coverage of the companies included is good,
37
 but there are some 
exceptions. The most notable one concerns the Greek data where many companies are 
missing. A query to BvD confirmed that their data only cover about 5% of the active 
businesses in Greece. 
The present analysis focuses on private companies, since, in the EU, it is mainly those 
companies that have shown to be interested in foreign incorporations.
38
 Orbis has a search 
function that allows for the search of ‘standardised legal forms’, but it is more reliable to 
choose manually the precise types of company for each of the Member States. This leads to a 
list of 14.7 million private companies incorporated in all Member States today. Subsequently, 
we restricted the search to those companies where at least one director or senior manager is 
from a foreign country. For our purposes, it makes sense to exclude someone who runs a 
business in another Member State but establishes a company in his or her country of 
nationality. In the regression analysis,
39
 we are interested in persons who want to incorporate 
companies in another Member State despite having no special attachment to that country. The 
situation is different for nationals of that other country. For example, the control variable of a 
common language can be one of the variables explaining why a businessperson from Portugal 
may not incorporate a Finnish company, but this argument would not apply if this person 
were a Finnish national who runs his or her own business in Portugal with a company 
incorporated in Finland. 
This search operation reduces the number of private companies available to a manageable 
size of 1.1 million companies. We also had to check to what extent this might exclude 
relevant information. In total, 63% of the private companies from all Member States provide 
information about the nationality of their directors and senior managers. For 13 of the 28 
Member States, however, less than 50% of the companies include such information. 
However, generally speaking, for those countries any other information that may be helpful 
for the purposes of the present research is even less likely to be available in Orbis. Thus, the 
best that can be done is to use means of extrapolation as far as the data are incomplete, and, 
in the regression analysis, include control variables for the proportion of companies included 
in the dataset. We also checked for the robustness of any findings by way of excluding the 
countries where only limited data are available.
40
 
In the Orbis search results, we selected a number of fields relevant for the purposes of our 
research, also considering the proxies suggested by previous research.
41
 Thus, for the main 
parts of the analysis, we downloaded information about (i) the address and contact details of 
the company, (ii) the number of current directors and managers, their nationality, place of 
residence and job title, and (iii) the nature of the company’s shareholders, namely whether 
they are also the directors or senior managers of the company and whether they are natural or 
legal persons. While it would be interesting to have further details about the companies in 
                                                 
37
 See also Section 3.1, below. 
38
 See Table 1, above. This is different from the situation in the US where the market of incorporations is mainly 
(though not only) about re-incorporations of larger listed companies. 
39
 See Section 4, below. 
40
 See Sections 3.1 and 4., below. 
41
 See Section 2.2, above. 
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question, for example, their employees and their business locations, those data are rarely 
available for private companies. 
The Orbis category ‘directors and managers’ does not disclose which positions Orbis 
classifies under this heading. For most private companies, the main persons reported here are 
the executive directors/managers, but for some of the bigger private companies it may also 
include other managers with the authority to act on behalf of the company. We suggest that it 
is justifiable to consider all of these positions in order to identify the companies of interest in 
this paper since they can be indicators of the ‘real seat’ of a company. For the companies 
established in the UK, we also filtered the search results so as to only include the companies’ 
directors, but the actual findings were very similar – with a correlation of close to 0.99.42 
Some of the current empirical literature examines not the total number of incorporated 
companies but the new incorporations in a particular year.
43
 For the purposes of the present 
study, we aimed to identify all new foreign incorporations from 1990 to 2015. Using the 
‘segmentation by year’ function provided by Orbis, this can, in principle, be achieved without 
downloading all of the data.
44
 However, sufficiently long and reliable time series data are 
only available for few of the Member States, notably the UK. We will therefore only use time 
series data for parts of subsequent analysis.
45
 
3. Descriptive statistics 
3.1 Estimation of foreign-incorporated companies 
While Orbis is a valuable global resource for information about companies, any search for 
specific details has to address its variations in data availability: variations between countries 
but also those between the relevant information about directors and senior managers (in the 
following, the term ‘managers’ will be used to refer to both of these groups).46 We therefore 
ascertained that for ten Member States less than 50% of the companies with at least one 
foreign manager provide information about the residence of at least one manager. In addition, 
as far as information is included in the Orbis data, it is often not useful since it does not 
mention the private address of the manager but simply restates the company’s address.  
Thus, instead of the residence of managers, the following analysis is based on their 
nationality, while here too there is some variation in the availability of nationality data for all 
managers of a company. Moreover, the Orbis categories ‘managers being shareholders’ and 
‘shareholders being natural or legal persons’ may be relevant since the foreign-incorporated 
companies that are of interest for this study are typically companies where natural persons are 
                                                 
42
 Correlation of 0.9889 between (i) the 27 observations that count the number of ltds that have a board of direc-
tors only consisting of persons from one of the other 27 Member States and (ii) the 27 observations that count 
the number of ltds where all ‘directors and managers’ are from one of the other 27 Member States. 
43
 Eg, Becht at al., above note 15; Braun et al, above note 18. 
44
 While Orbis only allows the search of companies with at least one director/senior manager from a particular 
country, it is possible to search for all companies with any directors from all countries of the world with the ex-
ception of this particular country, which can then be deducted from the total number of companies with infor-
mation about the nationality of directors/senior managers. 
45
 See Section 3.1 and 3.3, below. 
46
 See also LSE Enterprise, above note 6, at pp. 41-2. 
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the main shareholders as well as the managers of the company.
47
 The information about 
‘managers being shareholders’ is particularly well reported; thus, it will be used in the 
following. 
Table 2: Top-ten target countries of businesses incorporated in other Member States 
(estimation of all companies excluding companies established by residents) 
Country  Number of companies Multiplicator 
1. UK 227,064 1.7329 
2. Estonia 33,524 7.4270 
3. Romania 30,123 1.0126 
4. France 27,029 25.1569 
5. Slovakia 26,600 1.8165 
6. Luxembourg 10631 4.5478 
7. Czech Republic 8923 1.0297 
8. Ireland 8058 2.5086 
9. Germany 7866 1.5858 
10. Cyprus 4886 11.32309 
All Member States 420,429  
 
Table 2 presents the estimated top-ten target countries. Following on from the considerations 
about possible proxies and data availability, it is based on companies with all managers being 
from any Member States other than the country of incorporation and the majority of those 
managers being shareholders. The raw target data have been extrapolated to estimate the total 
number of those companies across Member States, using the multiplicator of Table 2.
48
 In 
addition, based on migration data provided by the UN, it has been estimated how many of the 
companies have been established by foreigners who are resident in the country of 
incorporation, a figure deducted from the number in the target data.
49
 
In order to check the robustness of this nationality-based method of establishing foreign-
incorporated companies, we compared our findings with the study of UK incorporations in 
the years 1997 to 2006 by Becht et al.
50
 For UK companies established in those years, it was 
still common to indicate the actual address of managers in the commercial register. Thus, we 
could compare the Becht et al data with our time series
51
 of foreign UK incorporations, the 
latter being based on the nationality of managers but then deducting the number of companies 
which were likely to be established by foreigners resident in the UK at the time of 
incorporation (again, using the UN migration data). Both datasets are highly correlated 
                                                 
47
 Such as in the case of Centros, above note 6. By contrast, special purpose entities (see Section 2.2, above) 
would often be subsidiaries of other companies. 
48
 The higher the multiplicator, the more unreliable the data may be (in particular, see France). 
49
 Thus, the following formula was used for each country pair with I = country of incorporation and M = country 
of managers: absolute value (raw data – migrants from M in I * companies per capita in I). The population data 
are from ww.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml. 
50
 Becht at al., above note 15. 
51
 See 2.3, final paragraph, above, and 3.3, below. 
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(0.986) which gives us confidence in our technique of identifying companies established by 
foreigners who also live in their country of nationality. 
3.2 Interpretation and network presentation 
In substance, it follows from Table 2 that the UK is by far the most popular target country, 
accounting for about 50% of the foreign incorporations. It is followed by four Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries in the top seven (Estonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Czech 
Republic), as well two further common law countries (Ireland and Cyprus) and three Western 
European countries (France, Luxembourg and Germany). 
Generally speaking, it is doubtful why in the EU law makers may want to attract foreign 
incorporations. Member States lack the financial incentives that have influenced Delaware in 
the market for incorporations in the US. Usually, no periodic franchise tax or similar charge 
is levied by EU Member States, and when a company is founded, only administrative costs 
are typically charged. In principle, no other fiscal motives exist, since, usually, factors largely 
equivalent to the ‘real seat’ concept are decisive for the determination of a company’s tax 
domicile. Moreover, irrespective of the legal structure, physical permanent establishments are 
generally taxed based on their location.
52
 For the individual Member States, accordingly, 
there remains, on the one hand, a possible prestige gain as a non-material advantage. On the 
other, Member States where foreign firms choose their registered seat may profit from more 
clients for lawyers and other consultants, thus collecting more taxes and creating more jobs.
53
 
It is, however, not implausible that some of the CEE countries have become popular target 
countries for foreign incorporations. After the fall of communism, the business laws of the 
CEE countries have been going through various phases of reform, thereby increasing the 
potential of some of them to attract foreign incorporations. An internet search also shows a 
number of web sites that promote incorporation of businesses in Estonia, Romania and 
Slovakia.
54
 Moreover, it is likely that the situation in the CEE countries is not only about 
matters of company law, but is also related to other areas of law such as favourable tax and 
labour laws.
55
 For example, we may think about the situation of a Finnish businesswoman 
who registers a private company in Estonia and rents an office there, but keeps her own 
residence in Finland from where she manages the company. Such a scenario is therefore 
different from the scenario where the company has no physical connection to the country of 
incorporation at all.
56
 However, such companies are also of interest for our purposes since the 
Finnish businesswoman could also have incorporated the company in Finland while merely 
renting an office in Estonia. The question of how far the place of incorporation is a deliberate 
choice – and therefore the impact of conflict of law rules related to the freedom of 
incorporation – is therefore also relevant in this scenario. 
                                                 
52
 But see also the subsequent paragraph and Section 4.2, below. 
53
 See Mathias Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law 321-2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008). 
54
 See, eg, www.estoniancompanyregistration.com/, www.companyincorporationestonia.com/, www.romania-
company.com/, www.theromanianclub.com/, www.slovenskespolocnosti.sk/en, http://zugimpex.com/slovakia-
company.html. 
55
 For corporate tax law see also Section 5.2, below. 
56
 See Section 2.2 above. 
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To get a fuller picture of the relationship between origin and target countries, it is necessary 
to consider the information for all countries, namely the matrix of each pair of possible 
countries which leads to 28 x 27 = 756 observations. This information can be presented as a 
network. Such a network presentation is helpful as it enables us to see whether cases of 
foreign incorporations are isolated or widespread (and thus, in the latter case, indicating that 
there may be an emerging market for incorporations in the EU). 
Figure 1: Network of businesses incorporated in other Member States with > 50 
businesses 
 
Figure 1 displays all of the country pairs that have a tie-strength of at least 50: i.e., based on 
the estimated figures, there are at least 50 businesses from the origin country that incorporate 
a company in the target country.
57
 The direction of the arrows indicates which country is the 
origin and which is the target country. The network analysis program was also instructed to 
shift the position of countries according to the strength of their relationships according to the 
technique of ‘spring embedding’.58 The figure shows that the UK is the centre of this mobility 
network. Many of the other close connections match geographic and linguistic similarities 
(e.g., Cyprus and Greece; the Czech Republic and Slovakia; Slovenia and Croatia; Sweden, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).  
                                                 
57
 Based on the scheme of the UN Statistics Division (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm), 
the colours of the nodes indicate the geographic classification into Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western 
European countries. 
58
 See http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C4_netdraw.html. 
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Table 3: Clusters of legal systems based on foreign incorporations
59
 
Clusters Countries 
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The closeness, according to these network data, can also be established more formally. 
Network analysis provides various tools to identify community structures.
60
 Some of those 
tools rely on binary data, but for a valued network – such as the current one – it is preferable 
to use tools that consider the full information in the dataset. One such method is to calculate 
‘optimisation clusters’. This refers to a formal method that ‘optimises a cost function which 
measures the total distance or similarity within classes for a proximity matrix’.61 
Optimisation clusters require that the researcher specifies in advance how many clusters shall 
be created. In Table 3 this has been done, based on the absolute number of incorporations, for 
up to ten clusters since, with more clusters, we would often only have clusters of only one or 
two countries. The table also indicates how well the respective clusters explain the entire 
dataset (R
2
). It can be seen that this number is low for the divisions with few clusters, but that 
it gradually increases with more clusters being added. For example, the eight-cluster division 
can then be seen as a plausible one, consisting of the following clusters (in the order from the 
table): a mixed one, an Eastern European one, a Western European one, a South-West and a 
South-East European one, a Central European one, and two mainly Nordic-Baltic ones.  
It is also revealing to ‘track’ the position of individual countries throughout the ten clusters. 
The following groups of countries are always in the same respective cluster: the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary; Finland, Estonia and Latvia; Poland, Romania and Italy; 
the UK and Ireland; Cyprus and Greece; and Belgium and Luxembourg. These groups may 
                                                 
59
 The abbreviations follow the official EU abbreviations, available at http://publications.europa.eu/code/en/en-
370100.htm. 
60
 See, eg, A Ferligoj, P Doreian and V Batagelj ‘Positions and Roles’, in The SAGE Handbook of Social Net-
work Analysis 434 (J Scott and P.J Carrington eds., London: Sage, 2011). 
61
 Definition at www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/2cvtid.htm. 
14 
 
be seen as intuitive ones as they are those of neighbouring countries with further linguistic, 
social and economic similarities.
62
 For the purposes of this paper, however, it also shows the 
rather limited effect of the freedom of establishment of the Treaty, as interpreted by the Court 
of Justice, on the mobility of companies across all Member States. 
3.3 Time series of new incorporations in the UK (1990-2015) 
As already mentioned, reliable time-series data about incorporations are not available across 
all Member States. The UK data are a rare exception. The following reports the time series 
for incorporations of foreign-based ltds in the UK (i.e. with all directors being shareholders 
and nationals from another Member State but deducting the companies established by 
foreigners living in the UK). As the scale of incorporations differs considerably, the part of 
Figure 2 reports the eight countries with the highest numbers of foreign incorporations, the 
second one the next eight countries, and the third one the remaining Member States. 
Figure 2: Time series of newly incorporated foreign-based UK ltds 1990-2015  
 
 
                                                 
62
 For further evaluation see the regression analysis in Section 4, below. 
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Figure 2 shows that prior to the 2000s most curves were flat, then followed by a rise of 
foreign ltd incorporations, first, in some of the pre-2004 Member States (notably, Germany, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria), and in the 2010s across all Member States (both 
‘old’ and ‘new’ ones). In some Member States, there has been a rise of UK ltd incorporations 
but then also a decline, at least for some years. According to Ringe,
63
 this happened in 
                                                 
63
 Ringe, above note 21. 
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Germany in particular, attributed to a reform of the law of private limited companies 
(MoMiG), but our figures also show some reversals of the general trend for Spain, Denmark, 
Belgium and Austria. However, overall, the number of newly incorporated foreign ltds has 
continued to rise. Thus, we do not confirm Ringe’s assessment of a mere ‘flash in the pan’. 
It can also be seen that most changes happened a number of years after the landmark case of 
Centros;
64
 thus, it seems that this judgment alone did not give businesses from other Member 
States the confidence to establish a company in the UK. Similarly, it is noticeable that in the 
post-2004 Member States the stark rise in UK incorporations only came a few years after 
their accession to the EU. Thus, this also justifies a cautious assessment of the effectiveness 
of the case law of the Court of Justice for corporate mobility in the EU. 
4. Regression analysis: do differences in conflict or laws rules matter? 
4.1 Methodological considerations 
In order to assess the relevance of differences in conflicts of laws rules applicable to 
companies more formally the subsequent regression analysis is based on the cross-sectional 
data of currently incorporated companies. While time series data can be helpful to establish 
causal relationships, the aforementioned limitations of data availability mean that only the 
cross-sectional data enable us to analyse the relevance of differences in conflict of law rules 
across all Member States. Likewise, it is not possible to analyse differences at the firm level 
since, for private companies, such information is not available on an EU-wide basis.
65
 
The incorporation data are count data. This indicates a Poisson or negative binomial 
distribution with a Generalized Linear Model (GLM). In the present case, negative binomial 
is preferred due to overdispersion.
66
 We use standard errors clustered by the countries of the 
commercial register, thus addressing the possibility that our data are correlated within groups 
of observations sharing the same country.
67
 
In all of the subsequent models, we use the original data on companies with all managers 
from another Member State and the majority of them being shareholders. We then also 
control for the availability of the relevant data in Orbis and migration to the country of 
incorporation (see Table 5, below: ‘multiplicator’ and ‘migration’). This approach was 
preferred over the use of the adjusted data (see Table 2, above). The adjustment was based on 
the assumption that migrants incorporate a company as frequently as the native population. It 
is also possible, however, that migrants are more likely to incorporate their own companies 
since it may be difficult for them to find employment in the public sector or local businesses. 
Thus, the use of migration as an explanatory variable is helpful since it would also capture 
any higher (or lower) rate of incorporations per capita of the migrant population. 
                                                 
64
 Above note 6. 
65
 See Section 2.3, above. 
66
 In Stata, we use ‘negative binomial parameter estimated via ML’. 
67
 For further technical details on regression analysis using count data see, eg, R Winkelmann, Econometric 
Analysis of Count Data (Berlin, Springer 5th ed 2008); S Coxe et al, ‘The Analysis of Count Data: A Gentle 
Introduction to Poisson Regression and Its Alternatives’ (2009) 91 Journal of Personality Assessment 121. 
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In the main regression analysis, we exclude the six countries with the most limited data 
(below 5%).
68
 To check the robustness of the findings, we also run regressions with all 
countries but the UK, the eleven countries with the most comprehensive data (above 50%)
69
 
and all 28 Member States. 
4.2 Explanatory variables 
The case law of the Court of Justice has facilitated the incorporation of companies in other 
Member States. Still, there may be ‘remnants’ of the real seat theory in some Member States, 
which might variously refer to the location of the administrative office or other fact-based 
criterions, in order to mitigate certain effects of a ‘pure’ incorporation theory.70 We code the 
level of ‘pureness’ of the incorporation theory as follows: 
A country gets ‘1’ if a connecting factor based upon the incorporation theory 
is clearly formulated in legislation or through judge-made law (i.e. in a way 
that everyone, even non-experts, can grasp it) and no exceptions are provided 
(i.e. no additional connecting factors based upon the location of a company’s 
real seat). The score ‘2/3’ denotes either (i) the situation that a connecting 
factor based upon the incorporation theory is clearly formulated but that this 
criterion is subject to exceptions, or (ii) that legal experts can identify that the 
country follows a connecting factor based upon the incorporation theory and 
no exceptions are provided but non-experts are uncertain about this position. 
The score ‘1/3’ refers to the previous scenario (ii) but exceptions to the 
incorporation theory clearly exist. Finally, ‘0’ is about to the scenario where 
even legal experts cannot identify that the country follows a connecting factor 
based upon the incorporation theory. 
In addition, in some Member States, rules of substantive company law contain requirements 
for companies to establish or maintain a specific connection to the territory of the Member 
State.
71
 It is a matter of doubt how far such a connection can be checked by the commercial 
registers (or, indeed, whether they have an incentive to do so) as will be discussed further in 
the next section. Still, it is worth scrutinising differences of this feature of substantive 
company law. It was coded as follows: 
A country gets ‘1’ if domestically incorporated companies do not have to have 
their headquarters or any other fact-based criteria on the domestic territory; 
a country gets 1/2 if domestic companies should have some factors on the 
domestic territory but this rule is uncertain; it gets ‘0’ otherwise.  
Based on these definitions, and with the information collected in a detailed comparative 
analysis,
72
 this leads to the classifications of Table 4 for the ‘pureness’ of incorporation 
                                                 
68
 Belgium, Croatia, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
69
 Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and the UK. 
70
 See Section 2.1, above. 
71
 The Court of Justice held that this (mere) regulation of domestic companies is compatible with the freedom of 
establishment, see ibid. 
72
 See LSE Enterprise, above note 6. 
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theory under private international law and the substantive company law being free from ‘real 
seat elements’. 
Table 4: Country classifications in private international and substantive company law 
(1) ‘Pureness’ of incorporation theory under private international law (max. 1) 
(2) Substantive company law free from ‘real seat elements’ (max. 1) 
 (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Austria 2/3 0  Italy 2/3 1 
Belgium 2/3 0  Latvia 1/3 0 
Bulgaria 1 1  Lithuania 1 0 
Croatia 2/3 1  Luxembourg 1/3 0 
Cyprus 1 1  Malta 1 1 
Czech Republic 1 1  Netherlands 1 1 
Denmark 1/3 1  Poland 0 ½ 
Estonia 2/3 0  Portugal 0 1 
Finland 1 1  Romania 2/3 1 
France 2/3 0  Slovakia 1 1 
Germany 2/3 1  Slovenia 2/3 0 
Greece 1/3 0  Spain 2/3 0 
Hungary 1 1  Sweden 1 1 
Ireland 1 1  United Kingdom 1 1 
 
The decision to incorporate in a foreign country can also be driven by a number of other 
factors. For this purpose, we use various control variables reported in Table 5. The main aim 
is to test whether other characteristics of the country of incorporation may be more important 
than conflict of laws rules. Further control variables account for the closeness of the country 
pairs. We also considered that the data on private companies as they exist today are likely to 
be influenced by both the recent past and the present: while the past is of importance for the 
incorporation decision, the present is also relevant since companies that still exist today make 
the implicit choice to keep the present legal form. 
Table 5: Description of explanatory variables 
Name Description  
(for country of incorporation unless 
stated otherwise) 
Source 
Incorporation 
score 
‘Remnants’ of the real seat theory 
under private international law or 
substantive company law. 
Own research, see definition about coding 
in text above 
 
Substantive 
company law 
Incorporation 
costs  
 
Indicator that measures minimum 
capital, costs, procedures and time 
for establishing a company 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/explore
topics/starting-a-business  
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Corporate tax 
rates  
Corporate tax rate  https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/servic
es/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-
online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html  
Rule of law Rule of Law score based on Word 
Governance Indicators 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/i
ndex.aspx#home  
Legal origin Dummy variable for countries of 
the same legal origin (English, 
French, German and Nordic) 
La Porta et al 2008, data available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publicati
ons/economic-consequences-legal-origins  
Official 
language 
Official language of country pairs http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/publications/
wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=3877  
Spoken 
language  
Language spoken by at least 20% 
of population of country pairs 
as previous 
Geographic 
distance 
Distances between the cities 
constituting the economic centres 
between country pairs, weighted by 
share of country’s population 
as previous 
Population  Population (in million) http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Population_and_popu
lation_change_statistics  
Companies per 
capita 
Limited companies (as reported in 
Orbis) per capita 
Own calculations, see 3.1 above 
Multiplicator Factor correcting for variations in 
data availability 
Own calculations, see 3.1 above 
Migration Number of international migrants http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/p
opulation/migration/data/estimates2/estima
tes15.shtml 
Manager 
country score 
‘Remnants’ of the real seat theory 
under private international law in 
the country of the managers 
Own research, see text above 
Country 
dummies 
Dummy variables for each country 
of the managers (with the UK as the 
reference category) 
 
 
Apart from conflict of laws rules, it could rather be low incorporation costs, low corporate tax 
rates and a good rule of law rating of the country of incorporation that attract foreign 
businesses. With respect to the possible relevance of corporate tax law, it is worth noting that 
the concept of tax residence diverges from the mere formal registered seat and is normally a 
fact-intense criterion, which, for instance, considers the place of a company’s business or its 
headquarter.
73
 Thus, such a variable is unlikely to be significant for companies that only have 
a ‘letterbox’ in the incorporation country while doing business in another Member State.74 
                                                 
73
 For a good overview see G Maisto (ed.), Residence of Companies Under Tax Treaties and EC Law (Amster-
dam: IBFD, 2009) (also on how the definition of these factual terms differs from the corresponding terms in the 
conflict of laws rules applicable to companies). A corresponding line of reasoning applies to the applicable in-
solvency law which, in the EU, it is based on the ‘centre of main interests’ (COMI) according to article 3 of 
Regulation (EU) 2015/848. 
74
 For the ambiguous term ‘letterbox companies’ see also Section 2.2, above. 
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However, it is likely to be relevant for companies that have some physical connection to the 
country of incorporation – with the consequence that the tax authorities apply domestic tax 
law, despite the fact that the company’s managers are based abroad.75 Those cases are within 
the scope of the present analysis.
76
 
More generally, it can be speculated that businesses may not choose a legal system by way of 
incorporation that is too unfamiliar to them. Thus, the variable on whether countries belong to 
the same ‘legal origin’, based on the contentious studies by La Porta and Djankov et al,77 
aims to account for this factor. This uses the categories of English, French, German or Nordic 
legal origin for all European countries, as reported in the most recent studies of this line of 
research.
78
  
Of course, not only legal similarities play a role. Language could matter since registration of 
a company typically requires the use of the official language of the respective country. It can 
also be relevant as far as the choice of a place of incorporation may mean that the founders 
may become involved in legal disputes in the target country. Geography is likely to matter for 
businesses that operate in a border region – which can also mean that the main place of 
business could be in the neighbouring country. The population of the incorporation country 
could also be relevant. In the US, the popularity of the small state of Delaware is partly due to 
the fact that Delaware can focus on being attractive to incorporations from other states while 
more populous states have to balance more diverse interests. But the reverse is also possible: 
countries with a larger population being considered as a more secure choice for incorporating 
a company. This variable also controls for the effect that some of the companies in question 
may do some business in their country of incorporation and may therefore benefit from the 
larger market of this country. 
The control variable of ‘companies per capita’ may capture a variety of factors. Some of 
those overlap with reasons already mentioned, such as costs of incorporation. But it is also 
worth testing whether, more generally, the form of the private limited company is popular in 
the country of incorporation, thus controlling for other difficult-to-code details of company 
law.
79
 Finally, as regards the country of incorporation, it was already mentioned (see 4.1, 
above) that the control variables ‘multiplicator’ and ‘migration’ are necessary since the 
regression analysis uses the original data of companies as available in Orbis. It was also 
checked whether there may be problems of multicollinearity; yet, none of the variables have a 
correlation of more than 0.5. 
With respect to the country of the managers, it may also be relevant to consider the respective 
conflict of laws rules of that country. As discussed above, the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice only places restrictions on Member States’ conflict of laws rules in so far as they 
                                                 
75
 Or where, in practice, tax authorities are not fully informed as regards the factual connections of the company 
to another country, or are lenient in the way they apply the law as regards this connection. 
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 See Section 3.2, above. 
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 For further discussion, see M Siems, ‘Varieties of legal systems: towards a new global taxonomy’ (2016) 12 
Journal of Institutional Economics 579.  
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 R La Porta et al, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46 Journal of Economic Literature 
285. Previous studies classified some of the CEE countries as belonging the category of ‘socialist legal origins’, 
eg, S Djankov et al, ‘Courts’ (2003) 118 Quarterly Journal of Economics 453. 
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 Also considering that the existing comparative datasets of company law focus on the law of public companies. 
See, eg, www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/datasets/. 
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apply vis-à-vis foreign companies, although a number of ambiguities remain in practice.
80
 
These ambiguities often stem from differences between Member States as to the exact scope 
of company law, and its boundaries with other areas of law,
81
 and often primarily affect 
foreign-incorporated companies.
82
 The existence of a ‘pure’ incorporation theory may thus 
not be the main concern for businesses seeking incorporation in a Member State, as long as 
any remnants of the real seat theory only affect companies incorporated elsewhere. However, 
beyond just measuring the closeness of a country’s conflict of laws rules to the incorporation 
theory, the incorporation score may well proxy for other features of a national legal system. 
For instance, historic reliance on the real seat doctrine as well as preservation, post-Centros, 
of some elements of that doctrine in a Member State’s conflict of laws rules may be 
correlated with company law rules aimed at protecting non-shareholder constituencies. 
Where a national company law is designed to give maximum freedom to shareholders in the 
internal organisation of private companies, the choice of another, foreign, company law for 
doing business in that Member State is unlikely to be regarded as problematic by the 
legislature in the real seat state: after all, most features of the foreign company law so chosen 
would also have been available under the company law of the real seat state. Since the real 
seat doctrine’s most important effect is to assert regulatory sovereignty over all business 
activity carried out in a particular jurisdiction, thereby reducing or negating choice of law, it 
may be expected that the original choice of that approach, and perhaps even more so the 
preservation of some of its elements post-Centros, correlates with the existence of mandatory 
rules of substantive company law that shareholders are unlikely to choose voluntarily. Thus, 
prima facie one may expect that the conflict of laws rules in both the country of incorporation 
and in the real seat, state might potentially influence the incorporation decision. 
Beyond these specific considerations, that there are also many unobservable reasons that may 
determine why people from a particular country may want to incorporate a private company 
in the first place. For example, this may be due to country differences in innovation or in 
bankruptcy, labour and social security laws. It is beyond the scope of this paper’s focus on 
the relevant factors in the country of incorporation to examine details of these laws. Thus, 
dummy variables for the country of the managers are included in order to consider any of 
those factors. 
4.3 Regression results 
The first three regression outputs report in Table 6 the results excluding the six countries with 
the most limited data (see 4.1, above). They are therefore based on 22 (place of 
incorporation) x 27 (place of business) = 594 observations. 
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 See Section 2.1, above. 
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 See in detail C Gerner-Beuerle and EP Schuster, ‘The Costs of Separation: Conflicts in Company and Insol-
vency Law in Europe’ (2014) 14 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 287. 
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 For an example, see Art. 9(2) Spanish Capital Companies Act 2010 (Ley de sociedades de capital). 
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Table 6: Negative binomial regressions (1) – dependent variable: number of companies 
with all managers being citizens of another Member State and more than half of those 
managers also being the shareholders of the company 
Independent variables: Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 
Coefficients and 
significance  
IRR 
Coefficients and 
significance  
Coefficients and 
significance  
Incorporation score 2.080279 ** 8.006701 1.469544 * 2.080279 ** 
Substantive company law -0.81764   0.441472 -0.79025   -0.81764   
Costs of incorporation 0.104062 ** 1.10967 0.083438 * 0.104062 ** 
Corporate tax rate -0.07587   0.926937 -0.0331   -0.07587   
Rule of law -0.60188   0.547779 -0.72458   -0.60188   
Legal origin 0.763907 ** 2.146644 0.750229 ** 0.763907 ** 
Official language 1.607175 ** 4.9887 1.242886 * 1.607175 ** 
Geographic distance -0.00135 ** 0.998655 -0.00144 ** -0.00135 ** 
Population (mn) 0.061998 ** 1.06396 0.061998 ** 0.061998 ** 
Companies per capita       13.93519 *     
Multiplicator -0.14319 * 0.866586 -0.31475 ** -0.14319 * 
Migrants 3.40E-06   1.000003 3.63E-06   3.4E-06   
Manager country score      1.872318  
Country dummies # **   # ** # ** 
Constant -0.44684   0.639647 0.630225       
Log pseudolikelihood -2825.45     -2802.81   -2825.45   
  n=594     n=594   n=594   
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level; # highest degree 
These results show that, as far as the legal variables are concerned, the incorporation score, 
the costs of incorporation and legal origin are consistently statistically significant, but not the 
variables on ‘real seat’ elements in substantive company law, corporate tax law and the rule 
of law. The lack of significance of the substantive law variable is not implausible as it may be 
doubtful how important this difference is in practice. For example, in Estonia, which we 
coded as having such a requirement, the country report of the underlying project suggests that 
‘there is no effective mechanism that would restrict the foreign-administrated companies to 
be registered in Estonia’.83 At a practical level, this insight is also confirmed by the fact that 
there are various providers that offer quick and uncomplicated incorporation in Estonia to 
foreign businesses.
84
 
The variables about official language and geography are significant with the expected signs. 
In a further model (not reported here), we also examined the role of the spoken language, but 
it was found to be less significant than the official language. The variable on population 
shows that, in the EU, larger countries have an advantage in attracting foreign incorporations. 
Model (2) includes the variable on ‘companies per capita’ and confirms that other factors 
may play a role for the incorporation decision. However, the incorporating score also retains 
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its significance; thus, it is not simply a proxy for such other differences. Model (3) adds the 
incorporation score of the country of the managers. It is insignificant, which is likely to be the 
result of the complex factors that account for the choices managers make when incorporating 
a private company. In further regressions (not reported here) we also checked a number of 
other combinations and variations of the variables
85
 without changes to the results. 
The coefficients of count data regressions do not lend themselves to intuitive interpretation as 
easily as OLS models. However, it is possible to say that a coefficient of x means that a 
change in the respective independent variable of 1 will result in a multiplication of the 
predicted count by e
x
.
86
 Table 6 reports these ‘incidence rate ratios’ (IRR) for model (1) and 
Table 7 provides further ways to interpret the coefficients of this model. 
Table 7: Interpretation of coefficients in model (1), above 
Independent variables: Coefficients and 
significance 
Change per 1 Unit 
Increase (IRR) 
Change per 
Standard 
Deviation 
Incorporation score 2.080279 ** 700.67% 213.79% 
Substantive company law -0.8176418  -55.85% -26.54% 
Costs of incorporation 0.1040623 ** 10.97% 68.23% 
Corporate tax rate -0.0758701  -7.31% -50.42% 
Rule of law -0.6018829  -45.22% -27.66% 
Legal origin 0.7639068 ** 114.66% 52.92% 
Official language 1.607175 ** 398.87% 75.38% 
Geographic distance -0.0013462 ** -0.13% -97.55% 
Population 6.20E-08 ** 0.00% 143.22% 
Multiplicator -0.143194 * -13.34% -127.28% 
Migrants 3.40E-06  0.00% 31.68% 
 
The column ‘change per 1 unit increase’ in Table 7 enables the calculation of an effect of 
changes to this variable, holding the other variables constant. The next column follows the 
same approach but examines the percentage impact of a one standard deviation increase. This 
is the best way to compare the effects of the individual variables. It can be seen that the 
incorporation score plays the largest role, followed by the population, geographic distance, 
official language, costs of incorporation and legal origin. 
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Table 8: Negative binomial regressions (2) – dependent variable: as Table 7 
Independent variables: Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 
Coefficients and 
significance  
Coefficients and 
significance  
Coefficients and 
significance  
Incorporation score 3.382553 ** 2.104793 ** 1.578953 ** 
Substantive company law -0.95515  -0.65626  -0.69515  
Costs of incorporation 0.10797 ** 0.101664 ** 0.063953 * 
Corporate tax rate -0.29792 ** -0.0836  -0.07589 * 
Rule of law 0.139134  -0.44879  -0.73922 * 
Legal origin 0.706026 * 0.749897 ** 0.762654 ** 
Official language 0.400527  1.388102 ** 1.171581 ** 
Geographic distance -0.00158 ** -0.00138 ** -0.0015 ** 
Population 8.04E-08 ** 5.75E-08 ** 3.60E-08 ** 
Multiplicator 0.685718  -0.16251 ** -0.13767 ** 
Migrants 7.79E-07  3.37E-06 * 3.22E-06 * 
Country dummies # ** # ** # ** 
Constant 0.833491  -0.133796  3.916033  
Log pseudolikelihood -1714.925  -3172.2658  -2865.7440  
 n=297  n=756  n=729  
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level; # highest degree 
To check the robustness of the findings, Table 8 reports the regression results for the 
specification of model (1) for modified country groups. Model (4) examines the eleven 
countries with the most comprehensive data and model (5) does so for all 28 Member States 
(even the six countries with the very limited data). Model (6) excludes the UK as a possible 
outlier given that more than 50% of the foreign incorporations are registered in the UK.
87
 It 
should be noted that this is a hypothetical scenario since in an EU without the UK, it may 
well have been the case that a Member State with a similar law (perhaps Ireland or Cyprus) 
would have taken the position of the UK as a popular target destination.
88
 
The main results are unchanged in all of the three models. In model (4), the lower 
significance level for some of the variables is likely to be due to the lower number of 
observations. In models (4) and (6) it is however also interesting that the variable on the 
corporate tax rate is now statistically significant, with the expected negative sign. In addition, 
in model (6) the negative significance of the rule of law variable is likely to be due to the 
popularity of some of the CEE countries as popular target destinations (see also Table 3, 
above). It can be speculated that the lower rule of law score of a country may not always be 
against the interest of companies since it may go hand in hand with lighter requirements in 
terms of doing business. In this respect, model (4) may indicate a form of ‘market 
segmentation’:89 businesses which only aim at reducing the initial incorporation costs do so 
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 Indeed, it can now already be seen that some of the incorporation agents promote Irish companies as an alter-
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 Similar to the discussion in the US, see, eg, M Barzuza, ‘Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Lia-
bility-Free Jurisdiction’, (2012) 98 Virginia Law Review 935. For Europe see A Zorzi, ‘A European Nevada? 
Bad Enforcement as an Edge in State Competition for Incorporations’ (2017) 18 European Business Organiza-
tion Law Review 251. 
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in the UK, while those which also aim at reducing taxation (and have a general preference for 
laxer laws) incorporate in other Member States. 
The importance of differences in conflict of laws rules has also been confirmed in a 
corresponding empirical survey of lawyers in all Member States.
90 
Its main finding is that, 
despite the case law of the Court of Justice, there are significant practical obstacles to 
corporate mobility in Europe. This shows in many of the survey answers and holds true for 
both the aggregate level of the responses and the analyses of the responses for particular 
groups of respondents. It also correlates with the fact that most of the respondents expressed 
support for EU harmonisation of conflict of laws rules applicable to companies. 
5. Conclusion 
The empirical research about corporate mobility in the EU has so far been limited in two 
respects: it has been focussed on the analysis of foreign-based companies in the UK and it has 
mainly been concerned with differences in the costs of incorporation. This paper had the aim 
to fill these gaps. 
In the descriptive statistics, based on data from all EU Member States, we identified the UK 
as the most popular target destination. To a lesser extent, foreign incorporations also take 
place in other Member States, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe, with Estonia, 
Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic being popular target destinations. However, the 
network analysis of these data also showed that the foreign incorporations typically happen 
between neighbouring countries with further linguistic, social and economic similarities; thus, 
the effect of the freedom of establishment on the mobility of companies across all Member 
States is still rather limited. The time series data of new incorporations in the UK also points 
towards the limited effect of the case law of the Court of Justice. Finally, the regression 
analysis suggests that decisions about domestic or foreign incorporations are not merely a 
result of the differences in substantive company law, in particular the costs of incorporation.
91
 
Rather, we found that conflict of laws rules plays a key role. Countries that have a clear-cut 
version of the ‘incorporation theory’ attract more incorporations than countries which have 
retained elements of the ‘real seat theory’. 
These findings can have important policy implications. They show that the case law of the 
Court of Justice has not made all differences in the conflicts of laws rules applicable to 
companies obsolete. Thus, a possible reading of these findings is that harmonisation of those 
rules may be recommended. The significant relationship between the ‘pureness’ of the 
incorporation theory and the use of a Member State’s companies by foreign incorporators can 
also provide an indication about the possible direction of a future harmonisation which aims 
to facilitate corporate mobility in Europe. 
Following the result of the UK’s ‘Brexit referendum’ from June 2016, it is possible that, after 
an eventual departure of the UK from the EU, the dynamics will change.
92
 For example, it 
could be suggested that other Member States will aim to fill the gap that will be left by the 
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Organization Law Review 225. 
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UK as ‘Europe’s Delaware’. However, it is also possible that the UK keeps strong ties with 
the EU: if it arranges bilateral treaties similar to Switzerland, there will be no change to the 
position of foreign companies incorporated in the UK (and vice versa). Yet, even if the UK 
decided for a looser arrangement, it may be the case that a future free trade arrangement 
would also cover the free movement of companies.
93
 Thus, while the present paper may not 
be the final word on matters of corporate mobility in the EU, it points towards the continuing 
need for empirically sound law making in this field. 
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